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LAW SCHOOL NOTES.
The new rules for admission to practice in the Supreie
Court of the State of Pennsylvania went into effect on January
I. These rules require that all persons who desire to practice
in the Supreme Court of the State shall take a final or law
examination before the committee of lawyers appointed by the
Supreme Court and known as the State Board of Law Examiners. The announcement of the first examination of the
State Board was made in April. and the first examination was
fixed for the twenty-second of June. Forty-seven members of
the graduating class desiring to practice in Pennsylvania presented themselves for examination. The examination was
written, the student not signing his own name to the paper.
Ninety-six persons in all took the examination, including the
forty-seven graduates of this department. I have been
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informed that slightly more than one-fourth the total number
of those who took the examination failed, but that forty-six of
the forty-seven graduates of the Law School were successfuL
In other words, of those who were not graduates of the department, more than 5o per cent failed, while of those who were
graduates, only one man out of forty-seven failed. This result
justifies the assertion made by members of the faculty to the
committee of the Bar which prepared the new rules for admission, that the graduates of the department were prepared on
graduation, without any special preparation, to take and pass
any examination which would be given by a Board of Examiners in law.
CONTRACT.

REFUSAL TO PERFORM.

RETRACTION.

ANTIC-

BREAC I.-Perkins v. Fracrdt aL, 31 So.. Rep. 773
(Supreme Court of Louisiana, December 2, 1901), 107 La. 390.
The facts briefly are as follows: In March, 1898, one Mason,
of the defendant firm, and one Perkins, the plaintiff, made an
agreement for the prolongation of Mason's irrigation canal
easterly along the north boundary of Perkins' land; later
another agreement provided for the prolongation of the same
canal in another direction, the reciprocal obligations being,
on the one part to construct the canal and furnish water from
year to year, on the other part to cultivate a specified number
of acres in rice and pay a particular water rent.
The plaintiff now brings suit to set aside these contracts on
the ground of non-performance, and to recover damages. The
facts appeared as follows: In 1899 the defendant failed to
furnish to a certain part of the land enough water; in i9oo the
defendant refused to furnish any water at all. The plaintiff
claims that such action was a complete rescission, justifying his
suit for damages. But the point especially desirable of notice
is that the refusal to furnish water for the crop of i9oo was a
hasty and imprudent step; it was speedily retracted within a
few days and while the situation was still intact; and thereafter
water was furnished by the defendant abundantly; the plaintiff
received it as if there had never been a refusal. And, more6ver, it appears that at the time of the refusal the defendant
made claim for and still claims a certain amount of unpaid
water rent. About two weeks after the defendant's refusal,
its retraction and the continuance of supply, the plaintiff
notified the defendant, in spite of the fact that he was constantly receiving the water, that he held his refusal of two
weeks past to be default under the contract, and that he would
sue to set said contract aside and for damages. The lower
court held, and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment,
that so long as things are whole a man who has rashly repudiIPATORY
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ated a contract may retract his repudiation. Here the demand
for water and the refusal and its retraction took place early in
the season, when the crop could without detriment wait for a
time for the water. The objection to such ruling is that a court
is reading into an agreement something that is not necessarily
there, and probably is not there at all; but a generally prevailing policy of all courts is to adjust a situation reasonably where
a man has entered into unreasonable transactions. But to continue with the rulings of the court: it was further found that
the notification by the plaintiff that the refusal was considered
a default was even then not sufficient to prevent the defendant
from taking advantage of an opportunity beneficially to retract
the refusal. The contract was not put an end to by such
refusal or by the notice. It continued in full force and effect;
nothing short of a judgment-barring, of course, consent of
the parties, or other sufficient methods--could bring it to an
end. And reference was made to the Civil Code. Article 2047.
The point for especial attention is whether retusal and retraction, even when held by the opposite party as default but not
definitely acted upon, are capable of extinguishing an obligation, if no direct injury has fallen upon such opposite party on
account of the refusal and if no decided change of position has
taken place. It has been generally held that mere repudiation
does not put an end to the contract, but only entitles the
injured party, at his election, to terminate it. Therefore the
refusal may be withdrawn at any time before it has been accepted or decisively acted upon by the other party, and the
party refusing may take advantage of any event which will
enable him to retract the refusal and proceed to carry out his
agreement. But the question as to what is sufficient decisive
action by the party who elects to consider the refusal as an entire extinguishment of the contract is wholly unsettled. In one
of the latestcasesin America, this questionofanticipatorybreach
arose, and it was adjudged that a mere refusal was sufficient
to constitute a final breach and the injured party might sue
upon the contract at once, without waiting even for the time
for performance to arrive. Mitt. R. Fund Ass'n'v. Taylor, 99
If. after a refusal, an election to sue is conVa. 2o8 (90oi).
sidered as a sufficient notification that the contract is held to
be at an end by the injured person, we then come to an equally
unsettled and difficult question: when may the injured party
sue?
If a party to a contract has paid money, or in some way
substantially fulfilled, even in part, his side of the contract, and
the other party refuses to perform before the time for his performance has virtually arrived, it is generally considered that
restitution may be haa at once. Giles v. Edwards,7 T. R. i8
(797); Farrer v. Nightingalc. 2 Esp. 639 (i8o7): Lyon v.
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Annable, 4 Conn. 350 (1822); Widdlc v. Lyman, 2 Peak's Rep.
3o (i829); Wilkinson v. Ferree, 24 Pa. 19o (1855); Doherty v.
Dolan, 65 Me. 87 (1876); Payne v. Ponieroy, 21 D. C. 243
(1895). But it was recognized long ago in Pennsylvania that
notice of an intention not to perform a contract, if not accepted by the other party as a present breach, remained only
a matter of intention and might be withdrawn at any time
before the performance was in fact due, Zuch v. McClure, 98
Pa. 541 (i88i), but an expressed intention to treat the refusal
as a breach and to sue at once was sufficient to end the whole
contract and to justify such suit. This rule, allowing a suit
before the time for performance had arrived, was adopted in
England, in the leading case of Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 El.
& BI. 678 (185.:); and in the United States Supreme Court,
in Roehrn v. Horst, 178 U. S. (i89),- and seems applicable,
whether or not the defendant has retracted his refusal between the time when the injured or opposite party published
his determination to sue upon the contract and the time when
performance was really -due. But in Roehm v. Horst (supra)
the rulings seem to imply that should the party receiving the
refusal not elect to sue at once, the refusing party may retract
while the agreement is kept open for his benefit, and proceed
with his performance when duethe contract remaining always
in force. In accord, Dingley v. 01cr, 117 U. S.49o (1885), had
already decided that "the refusal of one party to deliver goods
under a contract, if not treated a- final by the party making
the demand, cannot afterwards be treated as a refusal authorizing the commencement of a suit." Thus far the rule is that
one may treat a refusal as a complete extinguishing of the
contract by bringing suit upon the contract at once, even
though the time for performance has not arrived; but if the
refusal is not acted upon immediately, the right to sue is lost
and the contract remains valid, allowing the refusing party to
take advantage of intervening benefits.
This rule is denied in other states, among which is Massachusetts, where, in Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874),
it was held that an action for anticipatory breach could not
be maintained, even though there was proof of an absolute
refusal on the defendant's part ever to perform, for the opposite party, the plaintiff, must be able to show the defendant's indisposition to tender performance at a time when and
under conditions such that he is entitled fiy the agreement
to require performance. This rule was first announced in
Massachusetts in Frazicr v. Cushman. 12 Mass. 277 (I815);
and found support in Ponicroy v. Gold. 2 Met. (Mass. 1841)
5oo; Hapgood v. Show, io5 Mass. 276 (1770); Carpenter v.
Holoinbe, 1o5 Mass. 28o (187o), and has found support in England in Lo'loch v. Franhlin. 8 Q. B. 371 (1846): Ripley v. Mc-
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Clure, 4 Exch. 345 (1849); Phillpotts v. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475

(1855). These cases held that the announcement of a deternination to break a contract before the time for fulfillment has
arrived is nothing more than an offer to rescind; and if not
retracted in due time. it is evidence, when the day for performance comes, of a continued refusal and decisive breach.
Ilowever, there is a well-recognized principle, soundly supported, that a refusal at any time to perform puts an end to
the contract, and the injured party may immediately claim
damages, but must reduce those damages by making the best
use he can of his liberty. Bowdell v. Parsons, IO East. 359
(i8oS); Planch v. Colburn, 8 Bing. 14 (1831); Short v. Stone,
8 Q. B. 358 (1846); Drake v. Goree, 22 Ala. 4o9 (1853); Leigh v-.
Patterson, 8 Taunt. 540 (1868); Festing v. Hunt, 6 Manitoba,
381 (i89o); Elder v. Chapman, 176 Ill. 142 (1898). And other
courts have modified the rules above so that an expressed intention never to perform, if made before the contract time for
performance, though not of itself a breach, and withdrawable
at any time until the other party has taken some conclusive
action upon it, becomes irrevocable by the injured party's
bringing suit. Swain v. Scanans, 9 Wall. 254 (1869); La SociWte v. Milders, 49 L. T. N. S. 55 (1883); and compare Zuch v.

McClure, 98 Pa. 541 (ig8i).
The doctrine of allowing suit upon an anticipatory breach,
at the election of the injured party, has been looked upon
with approval, and often with unqualified favor, in the following cases in England: Cort v. A. and U. R. R. Co., 17 Q. B.
127 (1851); Danube and B. S. R. R. Co. v. Xenos, ii C. B. N.
S. 152 (i86i); Frost v. Knight, L. R. 5 Exch. 322 (x87o); and

in the following cases in the United States, inter alia: Crabtree
v. Messersnrith, 19 Iowa, 179 (1865); Fox v. Kitton, 19 Il. 519

(1858); Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md. 567 (1872); Burtis v.
Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246 (i87o); Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y.
362 (1875); Wolf v. Marsh, 54 Cal. 228 (188o); Thompson v.
Kyle, 39 Fla. 582 (x897); Kurtz v. Flank, 76 Ind. 594- (1881);
Platt v. Brand, 26 Mich. 173 (1872); Kalkhoff v. Nelson, 6o
Minn. 284 (1892); Mfg. Co. v. McCord, 65 Mo. App. 5o7
(1896); Schmitt v. Schnell, 14 Ohio C. C. 153 (1897); Mount-

joy % MAetzgar, 9 Phila. 1o (1872); Davis v. Grand Rapids Co.,
4! W. Va. 717 1896); Chapman v. Belt- Co., 35 S. E. 1013
(V. Va. i9o2). Other courts demand that the refusal shall
have been distinct, unequivocal and absolute, or that it shall
have gone to the essence of the contract before the injured
party is justified in suing at once. Lee v. M. Life Ass'n, 97
Va. x6o (igoo); Spiers v. Union Drop Forge Co., i8o Mass.
92 (i9o2).
The latter case verifies the inconsistency of the
rules upon this topic in Massachusetts. Cf. Daniels v. Newton

(supra).
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Without dissent, in the majority of the states, the refusat
must be treated and acted upon as such by-the party to whom
the promise was made; for if he afterward continue to urge
or demand a compliance with the contract, it is plain that he
does not understand it to be at an end (v. Benjamin on Sales,
2d ed., sec. 568), and therefrom it may be readily deduced that
if he acquiesce in receiving the benefits of a retraction he considers the contract still intact. See Smoot's case, 15 Wall.
(U. S.) 36 (1872). And still further, there is no lack of authority to support the vie~v that retraction may follow a refusal and
bring the whole contract into force again, even though the
refusal had been definitely accepted and the intention to sue
made known: this is the rule in Louisiana in the case which
opened our discussion.
That the plaintiff has an immediate right of action before
the time for performance arrives, whether such day has been
definitely ascertained or not, has been severely criticised and
said to be based upon a fallacy-but a reasonable one, indeedtransmitted through many years of judicial reasoning (14
Harvard Law Revicw, pp. 317, 421 ff.), yet it is established
by both English and Canadian courts, and finds sanction in an
overwhelming majority of our own state courts, though several of the states heartily condemn it, supra and Carstens v.
McDonald, 38 Neb. 858 (894); King v. Waterman, 55 Neb.
324 (898):

Parker v. Pettit, 43 N. S. L. 512 (i8i);

Stanford

v. McGill, 6 N. D. 536 (1897); and in many states the question
is still unsettled, so that the final outcome in America is not
yet certain, and indeed seems at times to be almost beyond
conjecture when we see a majority of the lesser states standing adverse to a minority of those of more impressive
authority. See Freer v. Dntton, 6L N. Y. 492 (1876); Day v.
Conn. Co., 45 Conn. 48o, 485 (1878); Dugan v. Andcrson. 36,
Md. 567 (1872); Maltby v. Eiscnhauer, 17 Kan. 3o8 (1876);
Sullivan v. McMillan, 26 Fla. 543 (189o), and ef. Thomson v-"
Kyle, 39 Fla. 582 (I897); Pinckney v. Danibaum, 72 Md. 173,
182 (189o).
"
The reasoning to support the majority opinion is the result
mostly of practical convenience and free-going policies. Ifthe plaintiff has a possible action on account of the defendant's
refusal, it is naturally contended that he might just as .well
have it at once; but the answer to such contention is that
the defendant is put to a disadvantage entirely too unfair and
far outweighing the benefit which accompanies the plaintiff's
right of immediate action. The defendant has promised to do
something at a future day: before that day comes we are allowing the plaintiff to sue him upon a promise which is not yet
thoroughly broken, or we might more subtly say. upon a promise which he has never made. If the contract made in January
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calls for work in July. and the promissor gives notice of a
refusal in February, it is obviously unjust to him to allow the
plaintiff to bring suit on account of such refusal at once, when
in reality he is not yet entitled to the work in question and
can be said to have suffered no damages, for the essential
breach of the contract will not, if at all, be consummated until
July. But on the other hand the law must consider a man's
word as good as his work, and when he has broken his promise. he has broken all that the promisee then had to rely upon,
all that represented the work which the promisee was eventually to require; and if the promise cannot be preserved entire,
then the precariousness of the promisee's position increases
from day to day. This is answered by commanding that the
promisee treat the refusal as a breach of the contract, refuse
to accept a retraction if offered, enter into contractual relation
with more reliable parties and sue upon the broken -promise
when the day set for performance has arrived.
It is also necessary to consider the case in which the defendant, having refused in February, retracts the refusal and proceeds to perform in July. Why, then. should the plaintiff,
having supposedly sustained no disadvai'tage, but rather having received the full benefit of the contract in view of the
defendant's retraction, be allowed to set aside the contract on
the ground of anticipatory breach, when such work has been
tendered as he bargained for, in spite-of the ephemeral refusal?
In such event, unless the plaintiff, feeling the magnitude of the
refusal, has so changed his position that he cannot let the
contract go on without a substantial prejudice to his plans,
certainly the defendant should be permitted to retract and
repent of his hasty and probably unadvised determination.
The doctrine of anticipatory breach, if carried to its logical
conclusion, would wholly deprive the promissor of any opportunity of making a beneficial retraction or of taking advantage of helpful intervening circumstances, even though
any reasonable number of reasonably supported refusals
and retractions should occur preceding the time for performance or while allowing due indulgence without injury to
the plaintiff, if the work finally is done in harniony with the
stipulations of the contract. We should presume no change
of relations sufficiently material to allow an action to lie for a
breach of the contract. Whence it has been adjudged that if
the promisee, after receiving the repudiation, demands or
manifests a willingness to receive performance, his rights are
lost; and having had the benefit of a retraction, thereafter he
may not set up his right to end the contract, and he has
justified the promissor in making the best use possible of all
supervening circumstances. Leake on Contracts (3d ed.),
752, and notes; Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. iii; Leigh v.

702

NOTES.

Patterson (supra); Phillpotts v. Evans (supra). Moreover, if
one of the parties to a contract has derived an advantage from
a partial performance, he may not hold such and consider the
contract as rescinded because of the non-performance of the
residue. Boon v. Eyre, i H. BL 273 (1776); Hunt v. Silk, 5
East. 449 (i8o4); contra, see Gils v. Edwards,7 Term R. 181;
though the criterion of these cases seems to be whether a
reversion to primary relations is possible.
It*
has been laid down in some of the earlier decisions that
after the least default in an executory contract an offer to
execute came too late, thus practically sustaining the doctrine
of anticipatory breach. Pratt v. Craft, 20 Lo. An. 291 (1868);
in this case the defendant made no attempt to comply with
his part of the contract until more than two years after it had
been entered into, and after the plaintiff had suffered an essential change of position; and in the light of such facts it was
very easy for the court to make so broad a rule as the above.
By the same opinion, however, scmble that a retraction coming
before any detrimental change of position had occurred
between the parties would have been a good cause for considering the contract as still binding, in spite of the fact that the
earlier Louisiana case of Moreau v. Chauvin, 8 Rob. Lo. 16x
(1844), had announced also that the barest default was equivalent to a breach great enough to permit the plaintiff at once
to set the contract aside.
The Civil Code of Louisiana, Article 2047, expressly authorizes the courts to allow the .contract, if possible, to be performed after a retracted refusal; and in support is cited Turner
v. Colins, 2 Martin (U. S.) 6o0 (I822), where the plaintiff, not
having proved that he had sustained damages on account of
the temporary refusal, could recover no dam.ages nor could he
rescind the contract. References are there given to numerous
French treatises sustaining the ruling in that case..
The apparent severity of most of the Civil Code. is everywhere tempered by the rights of reason and'justice; and it is
only reasonable that a person should not be icompelled to
suffer undeserved injury and damage by being denied the
privilege of retracting a harmless and possibly a not unprovoked threat of refusal,'and without torturing the meaning of
the contract, fulfill its stipulations. If, however, the-theoretically injured party at once treats the refusal as a breach, makes
a change of plans such as he is justified in doing and enters
into safer contracts with more reliable parties, then the question becomes more difficult and confusing. In conclusion, we
deem it the most satisfactory rule that a party to an executory
contract should consider the promise as the extent of the
obligation, for while the contract remains executory the promise is the focus of his plans; and if the word is broken and
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unsafe, there can be nothing stable in the matter of contingent
arrangements. If the injured party solicits performance, however, he has waived his rights and the contract should remain
in full effect; if he treats the refusal as a breach, he should be
allowed to sue at his election, mitigating the damages in every
reasonable way.
E.H.B.

PICKETIxG A STORm. Ix.JuxcTIo.N.-Foskcr v. Retail Clerk'
Associatio,, 78 N. Y. Supp. 86o.-In this case, after the employees had been refused shorter hours, there was a strike and
the defendants, members of an allied labor union, stationed
themselves near the plaintiffs store persuading passers-by not
to deal there. They also distributed a placard containing the
following words: "Kirk Block [referring to the plaintiff] has
been declared unfair by the Union and this action has
been indorsed by the Trade Assembly. Union men keep
away."
An injunction was granted against entering the store or
standing upon the sidewalk in front of the store except for
bona fide purposes of trade; also against collecting crowds in
the vicinity and obstructing the passage of the people; also
against any force or intimidation. In this last injunction
the words force and intimidation are intended to be very comprehensive. No actual violence is needed to constitute intimidation, but all the circumstances are to be considered in determining whether force and intimidation are being used, such
circumstances as the number of men, the nature of the circulars and other devices and the general methods of the strikers.
Unless force and intimidation could be shown, the court refused to enjoin the picketing. When the defendants combined with others peaceably and by persuasion only to induce persons passing on the street to refrain from trading with
the plaintiff, they were not doing any unlawful act. Whether
picketing is unlawful must depend upon the circumstances of
each case. Intentional injury to another is not always legally
wrongful Any one man may induce another to refrain from
dealing at a certain store, though his motive be malicious, provided no slander be uttered. Again, the mere fact of combina-

tion does not convert a legal act into an illegal.
This is the position and these, in brief, the arguments of the

New York court on this vexed question. Before delivering
the decree, Justice Andrews says that a consultation of authorities from other jurisdictions would be useless, since cases for
any proposition could be found in abundance. This is too
true. Many of the courts, even in New York. have felt that
in cases like the present there is an injury which requires
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legal remedy, but they all find some difficulty in determining
on just what grounds to hold these acts illegal.
An injunction, of course, is granted only where property is
injured and where rights in property are interfered with.
Equity acts rather in spite of the criminality than because of it in any given instance. The protection of property is its particular duty. Consequently in all these cases
there is a conflict between the personal rights of one and
the property rights of another. Employers have a right
to carry on their business free from interference and
should not be compelled to give up any property to save
themselves from the business loss threatened by the interference of irresponsible workmen. On the other hand, there are
many rights in which the employee should be protected. He
should. be allowed to claim the highest wage possible and
should be free to use all his personal rights to obtain what he
can for his labor. In some respects the rights and interests
of the employer and employee are bound to conflict The law
must select which right is to prevail and to what extent.
The question to be answered in a review of this case is, can
persuasion be considered illegal under any circumstances? The
simple act of persuasion has never been considered either
criminal or tortious unless it has been used in the furtherance
of some unlawful purpose. But since the case of Lunilcy v.
Gyc. 2 Ellis and Blackburn, 216, it has been very- generally
held that it is tortious to persuade an employee under contract to leave the service of his employer from a mere motive
to injure the employer. There is a tendency to apply the same
rule where the employee is not working under contract. It was
suggested by Lord Coleridge that this was not a tort at common law, but was an actionable wrong merely by virtue of the'
English Statute of Laborers. The element of intent in this
tort was thought to be of statutory origin. Harm. and not
motive, is the essential element of a tort and it is generally said
that intent is entirely foreign to the realm of torts.
But even if Lundey v. Gye is good at common law, it does
not attempt to decide whether it is a tort to persuade customers not to deal with a certain tradesman for milicious reasons. The boycott is a powerful instrument to do harm and it
has often been termed illegal and has been enjoined. So often
it his been connected with actual force and intimidation that it
is not -easy to say just 1mw a court would stand where the
boycott was made effectual by persuasion alone. Can this
l ersuasion be tortious upon any theory?
A tort, positively defined, is a wrongful act causing harm to
another. In the case of persuasion. another element must be
added. and the definition must read, a wrongful act intentionally done to cause harm to another and actually causing
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harm. A tortious act in every case must first of all be a wrongful act. If harm is caused by the exercise of what is called a
legal right, there is no remedy, and that is so even where the
intent is evil (Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225). This then is
the first and main difficulty. Is the act of persuasion wrongful?
There are three considerations that enter into the determination of whether an act is legally wrongful. They are
harm, an essential element in all illegal acts; intent, not essen-.
tial, but a makeweight; and third, a consideration of the relative importance of the right injured to the right exercised by
the person doing the injury. The second consideration, intent,
is necessary in wrongful acts punished as criminal, perhaps because the penalty is a deprivation of freedom. In tort it is
usually absent, and it would seem that to determine whether
an act is wrongful so as to be a tort only the first and third
considerations should be used. But where the rights of the
opposing parties are of nearly equal importance, if great harm
must be occasioned by the exercise of the defendant's right,
the courts will be inclined to call his act illegal. If, however,
the defendant's right is of supreme importance, publicly
considered, and the law thinks it should be protected at
any expense, it will not hold his exercise of that right
unlawful, though it work harm to another. But if the
plaintiff's right is also of great public importance and it is to
the interest of society that it too should be protected at all
costs, at once a difficulty is encountered. Now, in just such a
case the element of intent might be introduced as a makeweight to solve the difficulty. In this way intent might enter
into the tort, to determine the wrongfulness of the act which
causes the harm. If this is a true explanation, we can see why
the words "with malicious intent" or the like are added. They
merely call attention to the fact that in the particular class of
actions where they are needed, the conflicting rights are both
so important that to make their exercise wrongful, an intent to
do harm must be present; that intent in this tort is essential
to make the act wrongful which does the harm: and that harm
is no sufficient test.
Even if this question were settled, still the tortiousness of
persuasion under such circumstances as exist in strike cases
would be doubtful. There remains the question of motive.
whether it is malicious. In almost all these cases there is a
double motive. The ultimate motive of the workingman is to
better his condition in the matter of wages, shorter hours and
the like. To accomplish this aim, a secondary purpose arises
to crush his employer if he does not yield. In some jurisdictions the ultimate aim of the workingman is considered so
favorably that the secondary motive is disregarded as a mere
incidental. But where it has not been considered good public
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policy to encourage the working class specially, the secondary
motive rises into prominence and naturally lessens defendant's
right to use his freedom of speech to the harm of another's
right of property. Thus again public policy may cause a difference in the law.
Thus far the discussion has .been confined to the act of persuasion itself. No consideration has been given to the fact of
combination which enters into all these cases. In some courts
the simple act of persuasion, though malicious, is not of sufficient consequence for the law to notice. It would unnecessarily limit the rights of the individual persuading to consider
such act unlawful. But the power of a combination, closely
organized, to do harm is so enormous that the welfare of the
community demands that it shall not be used maliciously for
the ruin of others. Mr. Justice Gibson accurately expressed
the thought as follows: "Where the act is lawful for an individual, it can be the subject of a conspiracy when done in
concert, where there is a direct intention that injury shall result from it or where the obiect is to benefit the conspirators to
the prejudice of the public or the oppression of individuals and
where such prejudice or oppression is the natural and necessary consequence" (Com. v. Carlisle, Brightley's Pa. Rep.).
Justice Agnew in a later case, after qucting the words above,
continued: "There is a potency in numbers when combined
which the law cannot overlook when injury is the consequence. . ..
If the motives of confederates be to oppress,
the means they use unlawful or the consequences to others injurious, their confederation will be a conspiracy" (Morris
Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. i87). These principles have been widely accepted and applied. The New York
case refuses to accept them in words while really accepting
them in application. There are no combinations illegal whose
intent is not to do harm. There are few, if any, cases of boycott which are unaccompanied with pressure, and therefore
intimidation in its widest meaning expressed by the New York
court. The true difference between the New York law and
Justice Gibson's dictum is a difference of attitude toward combinations. whether of hostility or of protection. The New
York court feels that it should not abridge the workingman's
right by giving the name of picketing a taint of illegality without an examination of the circumstances in each case.
The whole question is one of public policy and arises out of
new economic conditions and business methods. In old England, the birthplace of the common law. the only laborers were
farm laborers and they were much scattered. When they did
upon one memorable occasion combine to demand higher
wages, statutes were passed making their acts illegal. That was
possible at a time when laborers had no voice in legislation,
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but it would be highly impracticable now. As a consequence,
the burden of making the law to satisfy modern conditions has
been left to the courts in the exercise of their duty of interpreting and applying the common law to new cases. A simple
act of persuasion must have seemed entirely harmless several
centuries ago. Not until the age of large manufacturing and
mercantile establishments, employing armies of workmen, has
the mighty power of persuasion and social pressure been realized. Its baneful effects were not known and so the law was
not ready to cure the evil and to-day is not ready for a final
decision in this matter. The problem is more than legal; it is
also social and economic. Time alone Will tell what law is the
best law.
A.L.D.

